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48Abstract
This paper extends the New Keynesian model to allow for stochastic shifts in the mon-
etary policy regime. Agents cannot observe the regime and use a Bayesian learning rule
to make optimal inferences. Price setting is adapted to this environment: lagged expec-
tations about monetary policy inﬂuence the current inﬂation rate through an indexation
rule. No structural inﬂation persistence is assumed. We show that this model can cap-
ture stylized facts about short-run inﬂation dynamics both in periods of transition and in
stable environments. The role of expectations increases after regime shifts. This creates
a link between the degree of inﬂation persistence and the stability and transparency of
monetary policy. Thereby, our model can explain observed changes in inﬂation persistence.
Keywords: Inﬂation dynamics, regime shifts, Bayesian learning, inﬂation persistence
JEL: E30, E31, E32
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Non-technical Summary
Recent empirical studies on the conduct of monetary policy have pointed out signiﬁcant
shifts in the policy over the past decades. These shifts seem to have concerned the systematic
policy, the policy objectives as well as the monetary policy shocks.
Parallel to these shifts in the conduct of monetary policy, the dynamics of inﬂation has
changed over time as well: both the volatility and the persistence of inﬂation have decreased
since the end of the 70s. A growing number of papers report evidence suggesting a link
between changes in inﬂation dynamics and the stability and transparency of the monetary
policy regime.
Notwithstanding these empirical ﬁndings, standard monetary macroeconomic models as-
sume that the monetary policy regime is ﬁxed. To reproduce observed facts about inﬂation
dynamics such as inﬂation persistence and real costs of disinﬂations, many of these studies
model inﬂation as being structurally persistent, i.e. as being sluggish due to the backward-
looking price setting of ﬁrms.
This paper takes a diﬀerent approach by extending the standard New-Keynesian model
to allow for shifts in the monetary policy regime and for incomplete information on the part
of private agents. Firms’ staggered price setting is adapted to a world in which the central
bank’s target can shift and is not fully credible. We do at the same time not rely on structural
inﬂation persistence. This model is used to study the impact of changes in the conduct of
monetary policy on inﬂation dynamics and on the dynamic link between inﬂation and output.
Speciﬁcally, a shift in the monetary policy regime is captured by changes in the central
bank’s long-run inﬂation target and in the volatility of the control error. Private agents have
limited information about the type of the central bank and therefore face a signal extraction
problem. They use a Bayesian learning rule to make optimal inference about the current
regime. Since learning is gradual, this mechanism introduces an additional source of inﬂation
persistence in our model.
As we discuss, this source of inﬂation persistence does not play an important role in stable
periods. When agents had the time to learn about the type of the monetary policy and no6
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major change in policy occurs, the propagation of shocks is similar to that in an economy
where agents can directly observe the regime. In contrast, the role of learning increases in
periods of great uncertainty which typically follow a shift in the monetary policy regime.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows.
First, we show that our model generates realistic degrees of inﬂation persistence in stable
periods.
Second, in line with previous ﬁndings, the learning mechanism in our model contributes to
reproducing persistent and costly disinﬂations, and helps to account for systematic inﬂation
forecast errors during disinﬂation periods.
Third, on the top of previous ﬁndings, we show that our model can endogenously explain
observed changes in inﬂation persistence. Since learning is a major source of inﬂation per-
sistence in the model and since the role of learning increases in periods of uncertainty about
the regime, inﬂation persistence is also predicted to be higher in these unstable periods than
in more stable periods. Thereby, the signal extraction problem in our model creates a link
between inﬂation persistence and the lack of transparency and stability of monetary policy.
As we discuss, this mechanism by which the conduct of monetary policy inﬂuences inﬂation
dynamics is an alternative to the standard assumption of structural backward-looking price
setting both in explaining real costs of disinﬂations and in generating inﬂation persistence.
While the standard assumption of backward-looking price setting behavior is however, by
itself, not suﬃcient to account for observed changes in inﬂation dynamics over time, our
model tracks well the historic changes in inﬂation persistence between relatively stable and
relatively unstable periods.1 Introduction
In recent years, a growing number of empirical studies have pointed out shifts in the conduct
of monetary policy. Clarida, Gal` ı & Gertler (2000) document changes in the post-war U.S.
systematic monetary policy reaction function. Sims & Zha (2006) estimate regime shifts for the
U.S. monetary policy and ﬁnd signiﬁcant changes over the past decades which predominantly
bear on the volatility of the control error. Ireland (2005) reports changes in the Fed’s inﬂation
target.1
In addition, there has been growing evidence suggesting that the conduct of monetary
policy has an inﬂuence on the nature of inﬂation dynamics. According to these studies, the
persistence and the volatility of inﬂation have changed over time; moreover, these changes
appear to be linked to the stability and transparency of the monetary policy regime; see
e.g. Cogley & Sargent (2001 and 2005), Goodfriend & King (2001), Levin & Piger (2004),
Couvoisier & Mojon (2005), Benati (2005).
Notwithstanding these empirical ﬁndings, standard monetary macroeconomic models ex-
plicitly or implicitly assume that the monetary policy regime is ﬁxed.2 To reproduce observed
facts about inﬂation dynamics such as inﬂation persistence and real costs of disinﬂations,
many of these studies model inﬂation as being structurally persistent, i.e. as being sluggish
due to ﬁrms’ backward-looking price setting behavior.3
This paper takes a diﬀerent approach by extending the standard New-Keynesian model4
to allow for shifts in the monetary policy regime and for incomplete information on the part
of private agents. Firms’ price setting is adapted to a world in which the central bank’s target
can shift and is not fully credible. We do at the same time not rely on structural inﬂation
persistence. This model is used to study the impact of changes in the conduct of monetary
policy on inﬂation dynamics and on the dynamic link between inﬂation and output.
Speciﬁcally, we relax the assumption of a constant, perfectly observed and fully expected
inﬂation target and model shifts in the monetary policy regime as changes in the central
bank’s long-run target and in the volatility of the control error. Private agents have limited
1For other studies emphasizing changes in the inﬂation target and/or the volatility of monetary policy
shocks over time see e.g. Cogley & Sbordone (2005), Kozicki & Tinsley (2005), Primiceri (2005), Justiniano &
Primiceri (2006).
2Some of the mentioned models allow for shifts in the inﬂation target. At the same time, the eﬀects of these
shifts are neutralized by price setting assumptions. See e.g. Smets & Wouters (2004).
3Throughout the entire paper, we use ’structural’ or, equivalently, ’intrinsic’ inﬂation persistence to refer to
the fact that inﬂation directly depends on its past value.
4See e.g. Gal´ ı (2003) or Woodford (2003).
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perceive shifts in the regime as a stochastic process which we specify as a two-state Markov
switching process. Agents face a signal extraction problem. They use a Bayesian learning
rule to make optimal inference about the current regime; this inference is then used to form
expectations about the future. Similar speciﬁcations are suggested by Andolfatto & Gomme
(2003), Leeper & Zha (2003) and Schorfheide (2005).5 To avoid drastic policy changes after a
regime shift, we allow the central bank to smooth its actions by a simple convergence rule.
We build on Calvo-type staggered price setting on the part of ﬁrms. In the Phillips curve
we suggest, lagged expectations about monetary policy inﬂuence the inﬂation rate because
of the rule-of-thumb pricing behavior of a fraction of ﬁrms. This modiﬁed New Keynesian
Phillips Curve (NKPC) combines features of the standard New Keynesian and of the New
Classical theories.
In addition to the usual sources of inﬂation persistence, such as staggered price setting
combined with systematic monetary policy, in our model, the uncertainty about the monetary
policy regime and Bayesian learning also contribute to generating inﬂation persistence. An-
alyzing the dynamic predictions of this model in a disinﬂation experiment (regime shift) and
in response to monetary policy shocks within a given regime, we ﬁnd the following results.
First, we show that our model is able to reproduce persistent and costly disinﬂations, and to
account for systematic deviations of the forecast from the realized inﬂation during disinﬂation
periods. In addition, our model generates a trade-oﬀ between the speed of disinﬂation and
the sacriﬁce ratio. These ﬁndings are broadly in line with a large strand of literature studying
the implications of incomplete information and learning for disinﬂations.6
Second, for stable regimes, i.e. when agents have learned about the type of the cen-
tral bank and no shift occurs, we conﬁrm ﬁndings of Leeper & Zha (2003) and Schorfheide
(2005) according to which learning does not play an important role in the propagation of typ-
5For other papers on monetary policy assuming learning without departing from rationality see e.g. Erceg
& Levin (2003) and Collard & Dellas (2005). These authors use signal extraction based on Kalman ﬁlter. In
addition, since Evans & Honkapohja (2001) an extensive learning literature has developed in which some forms
of irrational expectations are assumed.
6Our disinﬂation analysis is most closely related to works by Andolfatto & Gomme (2003) and Erceg &
Levin (2003). Both model incomplete information and learning by a signal extraction problem. Andolfatto &
Gomme use Markov-switching process and Bayesian learning but their price setting assumptions are diﬀerent
from ours. Erceg & Levin build on Taylor contracts and on Kalman ﬁltering. In addition, there is a large
disinﬂation literature departing from the assumption of rational expectations. See e.g. Ball (1995), Goodfriend
& King (2005), Nicolae & Nolan (2006), Nunes (2005).
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these results can drastically change in periods of uncertainty which typically follow a regime
shift. When agents are confused about the regime, the role of learning increases. Sizeable
expectations-formation eﬀects then signiﬁcantly change the impact of typical interventions
during the transition process.
Third, we show that our model can endogenously explain observed changes in inﬂation
persistence. Since learning is a major source of inﬂation persistence in the model and since
the role of learning increases in periods of uncertainty about the regime, inﬂation persistence
is also predicted to be higher in these unstable periods than in more stable periods. Thereby,
the signal extraction problem in our model creates a link between inﬂation persistence and
the lack of transparency and stability of monetary policy.
As we discuss, the mechanism by which the monetary regime’s stability and transparency
inﬂuences inﬂation dynamics is an alternative to the assumption of structural backward-
looking price setting both in explaining real costs of disinﬂations and in generating inﬂation
persistence. While the assumption of backward-looking price setting is however, by itself, not
suﬃcient to account for observed changes in inﬂation dynamics over time, our model tracks
well the historic changes in inﬂation persistence between relatively stable and relatively un-
stable periods. Our ﬁndings are in line with those reported by Erceg & Levin (2003), Collard
& Dellas (2005), Orphanides & Williams (2005) and Milani (2005) who similarly point out
that models with incomplete information and private agents’ learning about the monetary pol-
icy can generate inﬂation persistence and reproduce realistic inﬂation and output dynamics
without or with relatively little intrinsic inﬂation persistence. However, none of these papers
discusses variations in the degree of inﬂation persistence and the role of policy stability and
transparency therein.7
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes stylized
facts about U.S. inﬂation dynamics and presents evidence for the varying degree of inﬂation
persistence over the past decades. Section 3 outlines the model. Section 4 presents the
implications of a regime shift from high to low inﬂation target. Section 5 presents the impact
of intra-regime interventions in stable and transition periods. Section 6 discusses the eﬀect of
regime shifts and transparency on inﬂation persistence and Section 7 concludes.
7Erceg & Levin (2003) focus on disinﬂation episodes, while the other cited papers are concentrating on
stable monetary policy regimes only.
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This section describes key properties of U.S. inﬂation dynamics over the past 35 years.
The upper panel in Figure 1 displays the evolution of the annualized quarterly inﬂation
rate and the output gap between 1970Q1 and 2005Q1. The bottom panel shows the evolution
of the inﬂation rate and the one quarter ahead inﬂation forecast.8 Descriptive statistics of the
inﬂation rate and the forecast errors are shown in table 1 for the entire sample and for three
diﬀerent subperiods.9 The following aspects are worth noting.
First, average inﬂation was the highest in the seventies, it decreased at the beginning of
the eighties and it has been even lower since the beginning of the nineties.
Second, disinﬂation periods seem to coincide with a persistent contraction in real produc-
tion. It is broadly acknowledged that the disinﬂation process itself contributed to some extent
to the decline in the output gap during these periods.
Finally, as shown by the diﬀerence between forecasted and realized inﬂation, the increasing
inﬂation of the 70s was systematically under-predicted, while during the disinﬂation periods
of the Volcker era but also at the beginning of the 90s, future inﬂation was systematically
overestimated. Root mean squared inﬂation forecast errors for the diﬀerent subperiods suggest
that uncertainty about future inﬂation was the highest in the 70s and at the beginning of the
80s, it has decreased in the second half of the 80s and it has been even lower since the
beginning of the 90s. Inﬂation uncertainty as captured by forecast errors is attributed to
agents’ uncertainty about the monetary policy objectives and / or the monetary policy’s lack
of credibility by e.g. Evans & Wachtel (1993), Dotsey & DeVaro (1995), Erceg & Levin (2003)
and Goodfriend & King (2005).
In addition, parallel to changes in mean inﬂation and in the root mean squared forecast
error, the persistence of inﬂation has also varied over the past decades. Table 2 displays our
estimates for the degree of persistence of the CPI and GDP deﬂator inﬂation for the entire
8Inﬂation rate in the upper panel is CPI inﬂation rate. CPI data from IMF International Financial Statistics.
Output gap data from OECD. The bottom panel inﬂation is the annualized quarterly growth of the GDP
deﬂator. The forecast data is taken from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, median growth rate of GDP
price index (before 1996 GDP implicit deﬂator, before 1992 GNP implicit deﬂator). Source: Federal Reserve
Bank Philadelphia. CPI forecast was not available before 1981. Livingston forecast errors for 6 months ahead
CPI show similar pattern.
9As pointed out in Levin & Piger (2004), there is broad agreement in the literature that there was a break in
inﬂation dynamics around the mid-80s. They estimate structural breaks for US GDP deﬂator and CPI inﬂation
series and ﬁnd signiﬁcant breaks in the intercept around 1991. Our subsamples follow their estimations.
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of autoregressive coeﬃcients.10 Speciﬁcally, we estimate the following equation by OLS:




where ρ can be shown to be the sum of the autoregressive coeﬃcients of the original πt series’
AR(p) process. Lag selection is based on the Akaike information criterion allowing for a
maximum lag length of 6 quarters. Median unbiased estimates and 90% conﬁdence intervals
of the coeﬃcient ρ were computed using Hansen’s (1999) grid bootstrap procedure.11
The following results stand out.
First, the degree of persistence estimated for the entire sample is signiﬁcantly higher than
the ones estimated over separate subsamples. This is to a large extent due to the fact that
ignoring shifts in mean inﬂation biases upwards the autocorrelation coeﬃcients’ estimates.
This result has also been pointed out by Levin & Piger (2004) and Courvoisier & Mojon
(2005).
Second, we conﬁrm ﬁndings of recent empirical literature according to which the degree of
inﬂation persistence has changed substantially over the sample period.12 In particular, inﬂa-
tion was relatively persistent in the 70s and early eighties. Persistence has however decreased
in the second half of the eighties. Since the early 90s, inﬂation appears to be close to white
noise.
Finally, it is important to note that the period of high inﬂation persistence corresponds
to a period of relatively high uncertainty about the future inﬂation rate as captured by root
mean squared forecast errors, while low inﬂation persistence coincides with periods of relative
certainty about the future inﬂation. In as far as inﬂation expectations are inﬂuenced by
monetary policy, this suggests a link between inﬂation persistence and the ability of monetary
policy to anchor expectations.
10The same measure of persistence is used e.g. in Clark (2006), Levin & Piger (2004) or Benati (2005). This
measure was advocated by Andrews & Chen (1994), who show that the sum of autoregressive coeﬃcients is
directly related to two alternative measures: the cumulative impulse response function and the spectrum at
zero frequency.
11The sampling distribution of the t-statistic t =
ˆ ρ−ρ
S(ˆ ρ) was simulated over a grid of 101 possible true values of
ρ over an interval given by the sample persistence estimate plus or minus four OLS standard errors. For each
possible value in the grid, 1000 replications were executed. Estimations use grid-bootstrap RATS procedure
written by Clark (2006) available at http://econ.queensu.ca/jae/2006-v21.5/clark
12See e.g. Taylor (2000), Cogley & Sargent (2001 and 2005), Levin & Piger (2004).
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been pointed out by Cogley & Sargent (2001 and 2005). Estimating a drifting coeﬃcient VAR
model for post-war data, Cogley & Sargent ﬁnd a strong positive correlation between the
inﬂation target and the persistence of inﬂation. The authors point out that changes in the
conduct of monetary policy ”may have contributed to the rise and fall of inﬂation as well as
to changes in its persistence”.
Similar ﬁndings are reported by Benati (2005) for the 20th century U.K. inﬂation rate.
Benati emphasizes that inﬂation persistence varies across monetary policy regimes. In par-
ticular, when monetary policy provided strong nominal anchors, inﬂation seems not to have
been persistent at all (before WWI and during the inﬂation targeting regime since 1992). The
less strong the nominal anchor in place, the higher the degree of inﬂation persistence is found
to be. Benati argues that his ﬁndings provide evidence in favor of the notion that the ability
of monetary policy to provide a credible nominal anchor is a key determinant of the degree of
inﬂation persistence.
In the remaining sections, we present a model which is consistent with these stylized
facts. In particular, it can reproduce real output costs of disinﬂations and realistic degrees of
inﬂation persistence. In addition to these features, it can also endogenously explain changes
in inﬂation persistence. Learning about unobservable monetary policy regimes is a major
source of inﬂation persistence in our model. The role of learning increases in periods of high
uncertainty about the monetary regime. This creates a link between persistence and the lack
of transparency and stability in monetary policy.
3 The Model
The model economy consists of a representative household, a continuum of monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms and the monetary policy authority. The model presented in this paper
departs from the standard New Keynesian monetary DSGE model13 in assumptions about
the formulation of monetary policy, about ﬁrms’ price setting behavior and about agents’
information structure. Our model is closely related to the one outlined in Schorfheide (2005)
with the most important diﬀerences lying in the monetary policy rules and the price setting
behavior of ﬁrms.
13See e.g. Gal´ ı (2003) or Woodford (2003).
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Most of the literature assumes that the monetary policy regime is ﬁxed and that the central
bank’s long-run inﬂation target is constant, known and fully anticipated by private agents.
We relax these assumptions and consider monetary policy regimes as being subject to changes
over time. In addition, we assume that private agents perceive the evolution of the monetary
regimes as a stochastic process.
inﬂation target, π∗ (st), and the volatility of the control error σ2
(st). Two regimes are considered.
One is characterized by a high long-run inﬂation target π∗H and loose control of the instrument
as captured by high volatility of the monetary policy shock σ2
H; this regime will be referred to





, i.e. a low inﬂation target and strict control of the instrument (’low-target’ regime,
st = L).
Following Leeper & Zha (2003), Andolfatto & Gomme (2003) and Schorfheide (2005),
private’ agents perception of the law of motion governing monetary policy regimes is modeled
as a two-state Markov-switching process. The transition probabilities between the regimes are





, where φij = Pr(st = j | st−1 = i) with
i,j = H,L and thus
P
j φij = 1 for ∀i.14
The monetary authority is assumed to inject money into the economy by making lump
sum transfers to households: Mt −Mt−1 = Tt, so as to control the nominal interest rate. The












where it is the gross riskfree nominal interest rate, r denotes the steady-state gross real in-
terest rate, πt is the gross inﬂation rate, Yt is real output and t is the state dependent







14The model does not give any explanation for the choice of the long-run target in the sense that the long-run
output level implied by π
∗L is equal to the long-run output level under π
∗H. The choice of the target might
be explained by reasons related to political economy for instance which are exogenous to our model. For an
empirical study of the reasons why the inﬂation target has changed over time see e.g. Ireland (2005).
15We have deﬁned the Taylor rule on output growth instead of the output gap in view of a future non-linear
13
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Monetary policy
Speciﬁcally, a monetary policy regime is deﬁned by the vector consisting of the long-runThe interest rate reacts to output growth and to the deviation of the inﬂation rate from
the central bank’s ’intermediate’ inﬂation target, π∗int
t . The intermediate target is allowed
to change progressively as a function of the central bank’s long-run inﬂation target and the
current inﬂation rate according to the rule:
π∗int
t = (π∗ (st))
1−λ (πt)
λ , (2)
where the parameter λ is an inverse measure of the speed of convergence to the long-run target.
A similar concept with a similar rule is used in Orphanides & Wilcox (1996). In contrast to
the Markov-switching process implying discontinuous jumps in the long-run inﬂation target,
the intermediate target and its convergence rule allow for less drastic changes in the monetary
policy even after discrete breaks in regimes. Such smoothed changes seem to be more in
line with empirically observable gradual shifts in the inﬂation target.16 Other theoretical
disinﬂation studies model changes in policy by a gradual exogenous linear decrease of the
inﬂation target.17 In contrast to these studies, our rule deﬁnes the operational intermediate
target endogenously as a function of the central bank’s long-run target and the current inﬂation
rate which seems to better capture central banks’ practice.
Note ﬁnally that we do not allow for changes in the policy rules’ coeﬃcients across regimes.
Our deﬁnition of a regime is in line with empirical ﬁndings in e.g. Primiceri (2005) and Sims
& Zha (2006). These authors emphasize the importance of changes in the volatility of the
control error, as opposed to changes in the systematic monetary policy, in explaining changes
in the business cycle.18
3.2 The representative household
As is standard in New Keynesian literature, the representative household is maximizing its
lifetime utility:
solution of the model. This modiﬁcation can also be found in e.g. Erceg & Levin (2003) and Schorfheide (2005).
It had a minor inﬂuence on our results. Our main conclusions especially were unaltered.
16For some recent empirical studies on changes in the inﬂation target see e.g. Cogley & Sargent (2001 &
2005), Kozicki & Tinsley (2005) and Ireland (2005). A recent example for desired gradualism in policy shifts is
provided by Greg Mankiw’s (2006) letter to Ben Bernanke in which Mankiw suggests Bernanke to introduce an
interest rate rule into monetary policy decision making, emphasizing that this change needs to be progressive.
17See e.g. Ball (1995), Goodfriend & King (2005), Ireland (2005).
18It should be noted that this view is debated in the literature: e.g. Clarida, Gal´ ı & Gertler (2000) have
shown instead that the coeﬃcients of the monetary policy rule have changed over time. For a theoretical model
of regime shifts exploring changes in coeﬃcients see Davig, Leeper & Chung (2004).
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where Mt/Pt stands for real cash balances; Ct is a consumption bundle which is the CES










the parameter ε > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between goods and ct (i) stands for the
















Labor hours supplied by the household to all ﬁrms are denoted by Lt =
R 1
0 lt (i)di. The
total of hours at the disposal of a household for labor and leisure is normalized to 1.
The maximization is subject to a sequence of period budget constraints:






wt (i)lt (i)di + it−1Bt−1 + Mt−1 + Tt,
with Bt denoting the end of period riskfree nominal bondholdings, Mt the end of period
money holdings, Πt (i) the proﬁts of ﬁrm i, wt (i) the nominal wage paid by ﬁrm i, Tt lump
sum transfers and it−1 the gross riskfree nominal interest rate paid on bonds as of the end of
period t − 1.
Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms in the economy each of which
produces a single diﬀerentiated good i. The production technology is linear in labor which is
hired in a perfectly competitive labor market:
yt (i) = Alt (i)
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3.3Firms are price setters. We follow Calvo (1983) in assuming that each period ﬁrms face
the probability ξ of being unable to reoptimize their prices. This probability is constant across
ﬁrms and constant over time. In periods when a ﬁrm is not reoptimizing, it is assumed to
index its previous period price pt−1 (i) by its previous period expectation of the intermediate
inﬂation target Et−1π∗int















The assumed indexation rule adapts the usual constant steady-state inﬂation indexation
to an environment where the central bank’s target is not constant, potentially unobserved
and imperfectly anticipated by private ﬁrms. While the assumption may seem ad-hoc, it
has several appealing features compared to the constant steady-state inﬂation indexation rule
assumed in Schorfheide (2005).
First, the steady-state being deﬁned as a non-stochastic state in which there is no un-
certainty regarding the inﬂation target, the central bank’s inﬂation target can deviate for a
very long period from the steady-state inﬂation rate. Especially, the expected duration of a
regime is plausibly much longer than the expected duration of newly set prices, which makes
it inconsistent to assume that ﬁrms would use steady-state inﬂation rate as their index if
they can have any information about the regime in place. In addition to being conceptually
more appropriate, our indexation rule eliminates various analytical shortcomings linked to the
steady-state indexation in a regime-switching setup. These will be discussed later.
Second, admitting that the Calvo price setting is a short-cut to more complicated price
setting schemes, it should be noted that the Et−1π∗int
t index can accommodate changes in
ﬁrms’ price setting behavior between high-target and low-target regimes. Such changes are
broadly documented in empirical literature.19 Indeed, the index reduces to a simple long-
run target indexation when the type of the central bank is observable or learned by agents.
Speciﬁcally, with π∗L = 0 in the low-target regime, there will be no indexation when agents
have learned about the regime they are in; in turn, in the high-target regime, agents index to
π∗H > 0.
Finally, note that our model reduces to the steady-state indexation model in the steady-
state.
19See e.g. Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) or Gagnon (2006).
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is the nominal stochastic discount factor, TC (.) stands
for total production costs and Xt,t+k is the cumulative index between the periods t and t+k:
Xt,t+k =
(
1 if k = 0
Et(π∗int
t+1 )Et+1(π∗int
t+2 ) × ... × Et+k−1(π∗int
t+k) if k > 0
Denoting by P∗






1−ε , the average




t )1−ε + (1 − ξ)(P∗
t )1−ε 1
1−ε . (6)
3.4 Beliefs and expectations
Following Andolfatto & Gomme (2003) and Schorfheide (2005), we describe two solutions of
this model. In the ﬁrst version, agents are assumed to have full information about the current
monetary regime. The j periods ahead expectation of a given variable zt is:
Et (zt+j) =
h








where υt is a vector deﬁned as follows: υt = [1,0]0 if st = H and υt = [0,1]0 if st = L.
In the second version, the monetary regime’s type is unobserved. In this case, agents face
a signal extraction problem. They will be assumed to make optimal inferences about the
probability of each state conditional on all information available in the given period. The
optimal inference is denoted by ˆ υt (Ωt) ≡ [Pr(st = H | Ωt);Pr(st = L | Ωt)]
0 where Ωt stands
for the information set of private agents which contains all structural parameters of the model,
all contemporaneous and past observable variables and the prior υ0. In this case, the j periods
ahead expectation of a given variable zt is given by
Et (zt+j) =
h
E (zt+j | st+j = H) E (zt+j | st+j = L)
i
Φjˆ υt (Ωt). (8)
Firms allowed to reoptimize set their prices to maximize their future expected discounted
ﬂow of proﬁts taking into account the probability of not being able to reoptimize in upcoming
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Therefore, even in the full information setting where the current type of the central bank is
known, agents still remain uncertain about the future regime.
It is common in literature to interpret the unobservability of the regime as the monetary
authority’s lack of credibility.20 At the same time, this credibility should not be confounded
with the more standard credibility concept which is linked to time inconsistency and results
from potential strategic interactions between an optimizing central bank and private agents.
In our model, private agents’ uncertainty about the type of the regime is exogenously assumed
and may stem from sources diﬀerent from low credibility such as the central bank’s lack of
transparency or ineﬃcient communication about its objectives.21
3.5 Equilibrium
Given the stochastic processes {t,st}
∞
t=0 ,and given the initial state of the economy: P0,M0,Y0
and υ0, the equilibrium is described by a path of {Ct,Lt,Yt,Mt,Pt,Wt,it}
∞
t=0 such that
1. Private agents make optimal inference about the probability of the state st;
2. Households maximize their lifetime utility subject to constraints taking prices and wages
as exogenous;
3. Firms set prices given their production technology and households’ demand for their
goods;
4. All markets clear and the transversality condition is satisﬁed.
3.6 Parameter Set
The numerical simulation of the model uses the following benchmark parameters. We assume
log-utility in all terms, σ = χ = η = 1. The subjective quarterly time discount factor β is set to
0.99, which implies a steady-state annual real interest rate of about 4 percent. The elasticity of
substitution between diﬀerentiated goods is ε = 11, which implies a steady-state mark-up of 10
percent. The probability of rule-of-thumb pricing is ξ = 0.75 which corresponds to an average
price duration of one year. The parameters of the Taylor rule are set to γ = 1.5,θ = 0.5. All
these values are standard in New Keynesian literature.22
20See e.g. Erceg & Levin (2003), Andolfatto & Gomme (2003).
21See e.g. Orphanides and Williams (2005).
22See e.g. Gal´ ı (2003) and references therein.
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long-run inﬂation target to an annual rate of 10 percent in the high-target regime and to
0 in the low-target regime. The standard deviation of the monetary policy shock is set to
σH = 0.8% (quarterly) in the high-target regime and σL = 0.25% in the low-target regime.
These values are broadly in line with empirical ﬁndings reported e.g. by Justiniano & Primiceri
(2006) for the time-varying volatility of the U.S. monetary policy shock.23 The learning




will therefore discuss the robustness of our results to the benchmark parameter set.
The parameters of the transition probabilities for remaining in the current state are set
to φjj = 0.96,j = H,L. This corresponds to Schorfheide’s estimation for the U.S. economy
and it implies an expected regime duration of 6.25 years. This may seem a bit short but, as
discussed below, it does not inﬂuence our results too much.24




2−φhh−φll, and are hence both equal to 0.5.
3.7 The Linearized Model
Following Schorfheide (2005), the model’s optimality conditions are linearized around the
non-stochastic steady-state deﬁned as the state in which all shocks are zero, and there is no
uncertainty about the type of the central bank. Steady-state inﬂation π∗ is set to the long-run





The ﬁrst order approximation of the household’s and ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions and
of the market clearing equations yields the following equation system.25 The intertemporal
consumption Euler equation takes the standard form of:
−σ˜ yt = ˜ ıt − Et˜ πt+1 − σEt˜ yt+1 (9)
The modiﬁed New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) is described by the equation
˜ πt = Et−1˜ π∗int
t + βEt
 




(1 − ξ)(1 − βξ)
ξ
ς˜ yt. (10)
23Sims & Zha (2006) report even more marked diﬀerences between the monetary policy shock’s volatility in
alternative regimes. According to their estimate allowing for 9 diﬀerent states, the monetary shocks’ volatility
was more than 12 times higher during what they identify as the ’Volcker regime’ than during the ’Greenspan
regime’.
24Leeper & Zha (2003) assume that the high regime is maintained for about twelve and the low regime for
about 25 years. Andolfatto & Gomme (2003) report estimates 8 to 10 years for Canadian data.
25Variables with tilde denote percentage deviations from the steady state.
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1−Y + σ is the elasticity of real wage with respect to output in the steady-state.
Relevant features of this Phillips curve will be discussed in the following subsection.
The linearized Taylor rule takes the following form:26
˜ ıt = (γ + λ − γλ) ˜ πt + θ(˜ yt − ˜ yt−1) + C,t, (11)
where C,t is a ’composite’ monetary policy shock deﬁned as:
C,t = (1 − λ)(1 − γ) ˜ π∗
(st) + t.
In both states, the composite shock follows a normal distribution, the mean and variance of
which are conditional on the regime: C,t ∼ N
h




The diﬀerence between the full information (FI) and the Bayesian learning (BL) settings
is that in the FI setting, agents can distinguish between the two terms of the composite shock
while in the BL setting they are assumed to observe C,t only, without knowing the precise
value of the inﬂation target and the monetary policy shock. In this case, agents’ optimal
inference about the probability of being in state st = H takes the following form:27
ˆ υ1,t (Ωt) =
fH (C,t)[φhhˆ υt−1,1 + φlh(1 − ˆ υt−1,1)]
fH (C,t)[φhhˆ υt−1,1 + φlh(1 − ˆ υt−1,1)] + fL (C,t)[φhlˆ υt−1,1 + φll(1 − ˆ υt−1,1)]
;
the probability of state st = L is then ˆ υ2,t = 1 − ˆ υ1,t.
Here, fi (C,t),i = H,L denotes the probability density function of the composite shock
conditional on the regime st = 1,2. This formula shows that the probability of a given state
depends on agents’ past inference and on the realization of the current composite shock given
the probability distribution of the shock conditional on the states and given the perceived law
of motion of the inﬂation target which is expressed by the transition probabilities.
Note that the inference problem is exogenous in the sense that it implies no feedback from
agents’ endogenous decisions to the inference. This assumption may be somewhat limiting the
implied eﬀect of learning in our model. However, the exogeneity of learning is crucial in order
to keep the model tractable. It also allows us to solve the model consisting of equations (9),
26Note that with the assumed policy rules, the Taylor principle requires γ + λ − γλ > 1. Assuming values of
γ > 1, this restriction requires λ < 1. This restriction is however not too restrictive, since λ = 1 would imply
that the central bank never converges to its target which is clearly implausible.
27Strictly speaking, this is the value of the posterior probability distribution function for in a given point
C,t. Note that the probability of observing this point in a continuous support is zero. This formula which
is often used in the literature can however be considered as the limit of the probability of observing C,t ± h,
when h → 0. For the deduction of the posterior probability distribution see e.g. Hamilton (1994) Ch.22.
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October 2006(10) and (11) linearly using the method described in Sims (2002) and compute the nonlinear
inference problem recursively. A detailed description of the solution can be found in Appendix
A.
3.8 Modiﬁed New Keynesian Phillips Curve
To understand the main characteristics of the modiﬁed New Keynesian Phillips Curve equation
(10), it is useful to consider the following transformation of the equation:
 















(1 − ξ)(1 − βξ)
ξ
ς˜ yt.
To compare, the standard NKPC with constant steady-state inﬂation indexation is:
˜ πt = βEt˜ πt+1 +
(1 − ξ)(1 − βξ)
ξ
ς˜ yt;









(1 − ξ)(1 − βξ)
ξ (1 + β)
ς˜ yt.
There are two important diﬀerences between the modiﬁed NKPC and the standard NKPC.
First, the modiﬁed NKPC captures the inﬂation rate’s ﬂuctuations around the intermediate
target while the standard NKPC describes the inﬂation rate’s ﬂuctuations around the constant
steady-state. Second, in addition to the factors implied by the steady-state indexation, with
the Et−1˜ π∗int
t indexation, unexpected changes in the target also inﬂuence the current inﬂation
rate.
It is important to note however that the modiﬁed NKPC model does not introduce struc-
tural inﬂation persistence. When the intermediate target is fully expected one period in
advance, i.e. Et−1˜ π∗int
t = ˜ π∗int
t , implied inﬂation ﬂuctuations around the target are purely for-
ward looking. Inﬂation persistence in our model stems from Bayesian learning combined with
staggered price setting and the given monetary policy assumptions. This makes our model
substantially diﬀerent from the HPC in which the cyclical ﬂuctuations around the steady-state
inﬂation are structurally persistent: the current inﬂation rate depends on the past inﬂation
rate as a result of the exogenously assumed backward looking behavior of a fraction of ﬁrms.
The degree of inﬂation persistence implied by the HPC depends on the model’s structural
28For a description of these models see e.g. Woodford (2003, Chapter 3).
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October 2006parameters and is thus constant. In the following sections, we will compare our model’s pre-
dictions with those of the HPC model.
The above described features of the modiﬁed NKPC have important implications for our
model’s predictions regarding the real impact of monetary policy. In our model, only unex-
pected changes in the target imply real eﬀects while the level of the target is neutral. In this
respect, the modiﬁed NKPC is closer to New Classical theories which emphasize following
Lucas (1972), that only unexpected monetary policy decisions can have an inﬂuence on real
economic activity. In contrast, with the HPC any change in the inﬂation rate, and hence in
the inﬂation target, is costly independent of whether it was expected by agents or not. This
diﬀerence is due to the diﬀerent sources of inﬂation persistence in the two models.
The standard NKPC on the other hand, has plainly counterfactual real implications in
the regime-switching setup. With steady-state indexation, the level of the inﬂation target is
predicted to aﬀect the output gap if and as long as the target is diﬀerent from the steady-
state, while shifts in the target have no real costs. In particular, output is implied to be
above (below) its steady-state as long as the target is above (below) steady-state inﬂation. In
this model used by Schorfheide (2005), the real eﬀects go beyond the adaptation of prices to
the new long-run target after a regime switch, implying that expansionary monetary policy
can generate higher output levels in the long-run. These implications are in contrast to
conventional wisdom stressing the temporary nature of monetary policy’s real eﬀects. They
also contradict empirically observed real costs of disinﬂations. Moreover, the quantitative
model predictions crucially depend on the choice of the steady-state inﬂation, which is quite
arbitrary in the current set-up. These counterfactual implications would also arise in regime-
switching models with partial backward looking indexation.29
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Markov-switching feature implies that the economy
will always be relatively far from the point of approximation around which the model is
linearized. Still, with the modiﬁed NKPC, the linearized model’s dynamics were found to
29Note that such short-comings do not only concern the linearized standard NKPC model. Long-run price
dispersions arising in the non-linear solution imply long-run regime-conditional output to be below its steady-
state in any case the long-run inﬂation target deviates from the constant steady-state index of ﬁxed prices.
The non-linear real predictions thereby also depend on the choice of the steady-state inﬂation rate. Moreover,
the predictions of the linearized solution may well be of the opposite sign as those of the non-linear solution.
The long-run real eﬀects in the non-linear solution are comparable to the steady-state distortions of the Calvo
model without indexation when the steady-state inﬂation is bigger than zero as discussed in e.g. Ascari (2004),
Bakhshi et al. (2003) and Cogley & Sbordone (2005).
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building on steady-state indexation, the diﬀerence between the linear and non-linear impulse
responses was found to be quite big.30
4 Disinﬂation
This section discusses the dynamic implications of our model in a disinﬂation experiment.
Disinﬂation is deﬁned as a shift from the high-target regime to the low-target regime.
4.1 Disinﬂation experiment
In this subsection, we examine the theoretical response to a disinﬂationary policy based on
the modiﬁed NKPC. Figure 2a displays the reaction of the inﬂation rate, the output gap, the
realized inﬂation forecast error (FEt = πt−Et−1πt) and agents’s beliefs under full information
(FI) and incomplete information with Bayesian learning (BL) after a regime switch from the
high-target to the low-target regime in period t = 1 under quick convergence policy (λ = 0).31
In addition, Figure 2b illustrates the implications of arguably more realistic gradual shift of
the operational target. This ﬁgure shows the impact of a regime shift under BL for diﬀerent
values of λ.
The following results stand out. First, in both the FI and the BL settings, disinﬂation
is costly. Second, the disinﬂation scenario implied by the BL assumption seems to be more
realistic in that it generates a slower decrease of the inﬂation rate, a more persistent decline
of the output gap and in that it reproduces the observed persistent overprediction of inﬂation
during the disinﬂation. The sacriﬁce ratio32 of the disinﬂation policy computed for both
settings shows in addition that disinﬂation is more costly when agents are uncertain about
the type of the central bank they face (SRFI = 0.52 vs. SRBL = 0.70).33 Last, the gradual
30A comprehensive discussion of the shortcomings of the non-linearities concerning the standard NKPC in a
regime-switching model is beyond the scope of this paper. Non-linear solutions were found by discretizing the
state space and using iteration on Euler equations (see Coleman, 1991). Result are available on request.
31Disinﬂation paths in the BL setting are averaged over 1000 random draws of a sequence of monetary shocks
(of 80 periods each)conditional on the regime. Simulations start from the steady state and the prior belief.
Before the regime shift, 40 periods of st = H are simulated to allow agents to learn which regime they are in.
32We follow Ball (1994) to compute the sacriﬁce as the undiscounted cumulated output gaps during the
transition period divided by the change in the inﬂation rate. Output gaps were computed in deviation of the
state-dependent long-run output level, which may slightly deviate from the steady-state in our model. We
considered the 10 ﬁrst periods after the regime shift.
33To compare, Ball (1994) and Erceg & Levin (2003) report a sacriﬁce ratio around 1.7 − 1.8% for the
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October 2006change of the intermediate target reduces the decline of production while it slows down the
disinﬂation process.
To understand what drives these results, note that the regime shift is unexpected in both
the FI and the BL settings. In the BL setting however, the gradual learning of the new target
keeps prices above the target for a longer period and thereby extends the period of output
contraction and increases the sacriﬁce ratio.
The smoothing of the operational target (λ > 0) aﬀects both the initial unexpected impact
of the regime-shift and the learning mechanism in the BL model. The gradual shift of the
target decreases the unexpected change of the policy on one hand and thereby contributes to
reduce real costs as indicated by a decrease in the sacriﬁce ratio (Figure 3). On the other
hand gradualism decreases the observable diﬀerence between the two regimes. This then leads
to more confusion and slower learning and thereby makes the disinﬂation process longer. It
should be noted that the parameter λ increases inﬂation persistence only in interaction with
the learning mechanism. In the FI setting, agents know the type of the monetary regime.
Therefore all prices are adjusted to the new regime in the period following the shift. Inﬂation
therefore always decreases quickly after a regime shift, independently of λ. In this setting, no
trade-oﬀ arises between lower real costs and the speed of disinﬂation.34
The learning mechanism is not only determined by the parameter λ but also by the dif-
ference between the two regimes. Thus, a smaller diﬀerence between the high and the low
inﬂation target or bigger volatilities of the monetary shock in either regime would have the
same impact on the learning mechanism under incomplete information as the eﬀect of an
increase in λ.
In addition, the transition probabilities inﬂuence learning in a non-trivial way. While an
increase in φhh signiﬁcantly slows down the disinﬂation process and increases its real costs,
a similar increase in φll would have negligible eﬀects only. This asymmetry is partly due to
the diﬀerence between the control errors’ volatilities under the two regimes and partly to the
initial beliefs’ role in learning.35
Volcker disinﬂation. There is however substantial uncertainty with regard to the precise value of observed
sacriﬁce ratios. Cecchetti & Rich (2001) estimate sacriﬁce ratios for the U.S. in the range of 1.3 to 10. Their
estimates are however not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
34Note that in the FI setting, the sacriﬁce ratio is also decreasing in λ. This is because the initial surprise
change in the inﬂation target decreases when λ increases.
35Changes in the transition probabilities also have a more subtle eﬀect: since agents attribute a non-zero
probability to a future regime shift, their inﬂation expectations will deviate from the long-run target even when
they have learned about the regime. This tends to keep inﬂation slightly above (below) the target in the low
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One of the major arguments in favor of the Hybrid Phillips Curve has been its capacity
to explain real costs of disinﬂations.36 To compare the implications of the modiﬁed NKPC
with those of the structural inﬂation persistence model, we re-simulated the same disinﬂation
experiment with the HPC (see Figure 4). As already discussed, the learning mechanism is
exogenous in the sense that it only depends on the regime-conditional distribution of the
monetary shocks and the parameters of the systematic monetary policy reaction function (see
equation (3.7) and the deﬁnition of C,t). Therefore, cross-model diﬀerences implied in the
trajectories of economic variables are exclusively implied by diﬀerences in the price setting
behavior which aﬀect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
As can be seen in the ﬁgure, the disinﬂation trajectories implied by the modiﬁed NKPC
under BL lie fairly close to those implied by the Hybrid Phillips Curve under both FI and
BL. On one hand, this conﬁrms that the HPC, is able to generate real costs and persistence
of disinﬂation as well as to reproduce systematic inﬂation forecast errors.37 On the other
hand however, the results suggest that structural inﬂation persistence, as accounted for by
the HPC, is not a necessary assumption to reproduce such results. Indeed, allowing for
incomplete information with Bayesian learning can lead to very similar disinﬂation patterns
without relying on structural inﬂation persistence.
5 Intra-regime policy interventions
As discussed in Leeper & Zha (2003), monetary policy shocks can aﬀect the economy via two
distinct channels. First, via the direct eﬀect which is the eﬀect of the shock conditional on the
regime. This is captured by linear impulse response functions in standard models. In addition,
there can be an expectations-formation eﬀect when the monetary policy shock induces agents
to change their beliefs about the regime in place. Shifts in beliefs in turn induce shifts in
the decision rules as has been pointed out by Lucas (1976). Whether expectations-formation
eﬀects are important in practice is an empirical matter. If such eﬀects are not important for
typical policy interventions, conventional VAR models can be used to evaluate the impact
(high) target regime and has a real eﬀect which is however negligible. When agents are more certain about
the permanence of a regime (as indicated by higher values of φii,i = H,L), then these expectation eﬀects are
decreased. In the limit, when one of the states is absorbing (φii = 1), the eﬀect completely disappears.
36See e.g. Fuhrer & Moore (1995) or Gal´ ı & Gertler (1999).
37Note that while inﬂation forecast errors implied by the HPC are bigger than those implied in the modiﬁed
NKPC model, such forecast errors do not play a role in generating real costs of disinﬂations in the HPC model.
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cannot be used for this purpose.38
In this section, we discuss the eﬀects of temporary monetary policy interventions modeled
by temporary deviations from the systematic monetary policy rule captured by the Taylor
rule. We ﬁrst describe the direct and the expectations-formation eﬀects and then study the
relative importance of these eﬀects.
In our model, the direct eﬀect of a shock corresponds to impulse responses under full
information. In contrast, under Bayesian Learning, impulse responses contain both direct and
expectations-formation eﬀects. Expectations-formation eﬀects can therefore be computed as
the diﬀerence between BL and FI impulse responses to a given shock.39
As is standard in the regime-shift literature, impulse responses will be deﬁned as deviations
from a variable’s trajectory conditional on the state instead of being deviations from the
steady-state.40 A precise description of the computation of impulse responses can be found in
Appendix B.
5.1 Direct vs. Expectation-Formation Eﬀects
Figure 5a displays the reaction of inﬂation, output, inﬂation forecast errors and the change
in the inferred probability for state st = L as implied by the modiﬁed NKPC model under
full information (dashed lines) and Bayesian learning (solid lines). The left-hand panels show
impulse responses to an expansionary one standard deviation monetary policy shock 1 = −σL,
while the right-hand panels display responses to 1 = −2σL, both with λ = 0. To compare,
we show impulse responses implied by the HPC in Figure 5b.
The following results stand out.
First, under full information, the impulse responses implied by the modiﬁed NKPC display
a fairly conventional pattern. This is because, as already discussed in section 3.8, when the
monetary policy regime is ﬁxed and observable, the modiﬁed NKPC collapses to the standard
NKPC in deviations from the long-run target.41
Second, when agents cannot observe the type of the regime, the expectations-formation
eﬀect can modify the implied paths of impulse responses. The expectations-formation eﬀect
38See Leeper & Zha (2003), Sims & Zha (2006).
39See Schorfheide (2005).
40See e.g. Schorfheide (2005) or Davig, Leeper & Chung (2004) and references therein.
41Note, that under λ > 0, the intermediate target can deviate from the long-run target in response to a
shock. This would create a wedge between impulse responses implied by the modiﬁed and the standard NKPC.
The diﬀerence is however minimal.
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high-target regime, the inﬂation rate would increase (decrease) and the output gap decrease
(increase) relative to the FI response. Thereby, the expectations-formation eﬀect tends to
reinforce the shock’s direct eﬀect on the inﬂation rate and to counterbalance the direct eﬀect
on the output gap.
Third, in the BL setting, the bigger shock, by triggering the learning mechanism, increases
the inﬂation forecast error more than proportionately. It also increases the forecast error’s
persistence (observe diﬀerence between BL and FI response to 1 = −2σL).
Finally, note that the impulse responses implied by the Hybrid Phillips Curve mainly
diﬀer from the modiﬁed NKPC model’s impulse responses in the trajectory of the inﬂation
rate. By the structural inﬂation persistence assumption, the inﬂation rate obviously becomes
more persistent. This however does not change the nature of the expectation-formation eﬀect
neither does it inﬂuence too much the trajectories of the other variables.
5.2 Incidence and size of expectations-formation eﬀects
It is important to stress that even under the BL scenario, expectations-formation does not
always play a signiﬁcant role. Some shocks do barely trigger the learning mechanism, while
others have a big impact on it. The incidence and the size of the expectations-formation
eﬀect implied by a monetary policy shock basically depends on the extent to which the shock
induces agents to shift their beliefs about the type of the central bank.
Figure 6 shows the shift in agents beliefs in the period of the shock as a function of the
shock’s size for both states s = H,L, given the benchmark parameter set and assuming a quick
convergence policy (λ = 0). As can be seen, with the benchmark parameter set, the learning
mechanism would essentially be triggered in the low-target regime for expansionary shocks
which are bigger than one standard deviation or restrictive shocks bigger than two standard
deviations. In contrast, in the high-target regime, the expectations-formation eﬀect becomes
most important for restrictive shocks between one and two standard deviations but overall
much less important than in the low-target regime.
To understand the particular non-monotonous pattern in the shifts in beliefs after an
intra-regime intervention, recall that the distribution of the composite shock C,t diﬀers in
both mean (¯ H
C < ¯ L
C) and variance (σH > σL) under the diﬀerent regimes. Since the high-
target regime is associated with a high volatility of the disturbance, not only expansionary
shocks but also unusually big restrictive shocks can be associated with this regime. This can
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two states, for bigger positive shocks.
Figure 7a shows 68% intervals for diﬀerent variables’ forecast error ˜ xt+j − Et(˜ xt+j) under
full information vs. Bayesian learning for both regimes st = H and L.42 Figure 7b displays
90% intervals. The tighter forecast error intervals under FI and BL are very similar, con-
ﬁrming that, typically, shocks do not trigger the learning mechanism under the benchmark
parameterization. At the same time, broader forecast error intervals reﬂect an important role
of expectations-formation. Overall, these results indicate that learning can play a role in the
propagation of some shocks but such shocks occur less frequently.43
The precise size of the expectations-formation eﬀect is inﬂuenced by the calibration of the
regimes and by the smoothing parameter of the intermediate target. Nevertheless, our results
are in line with those reported by Leeper & Zha (2003) and Schorfheide (2005).
5.3 Shocks in periods of transition
Our discussion so far has only focused on the implications of intra-regime interventions in
stable regimes, i.e. when agents had enough time to learn about the regime they are in.
This discussion necessarily ignored the impact of agents’ prior beliefs on the propagation of a
shock. This eﬀect is however not negligible. The learning mechanism and, by the expectations-
formation eﬀect, the model economy’s reaction to shocks are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by prior
beliefs. Agents’ prior beliefs in turn, can be quite diﬀerent in stable periods from their prior
beliefs in periods of confusion about the regime, which would typically arise in transition to a
new long-run target. Hence, the Bayesian learning model’s impulse responses are substantially
diﬀerent in stable and in transition periods.
To illustrate, Figure 8 shows the impact of an expansionary shock of annualized 100 basis
points (1 = −σL) in a stable low-target regime as opposed to its eﬀect when it occurs two
periods after the start of the disinﬂation.44 As can be seen, during the transition period when
agents are less certain about the type of the central bank, the same shock has substantially
42This corresponds to each variable’s one standard error interval under FI. This needs no longer be the case
under BL.
43Note, that due to the nonlinearities of the BL impulse responses, the forecast error intervals of a given
variable do not correspond to the intervals of impulse responses which were given to shocks of the same
conﬁdence interval. That is, typical responses lying within the forecast error interval of the variable may have
been generated by atypical shocks and vice versa, atypical impulse responses may be generated by typical
shocks.
44For the stable regime, the shock occurs after 40 periods in this regime.
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on the inﬂation rate and, after a temporarily higher output level, the shock leads to a persis-
tently more pronounced decline in output than in the stable environment. Note also, that the
inﬂation forecast error increases again as a result of greater regime uncertainty.
These results show that the regime-switch has a double impact in the short-run if the
regime is not directly observable. First the shift in the long-run inﬂation target has a real
eﬀect until agents have learned about it. And second, it confuses agents. This signiﬁcantly
modiﬁes the propagation of shocks during transition compared to stable periods because of
the increased role of expectations-formation eﬀects.
6 Regime-uncertainty and persistence
As discussed so far, the Bayesian learning model establishes a link between agents’ uncer-
tainty about the monetary policy regime and the propagation of monetary policy shocks in
the economy. The mechanism is based on the varying incidence of expectations-formation
eﬀects depending on agents’ prior beliefs about the monetary policy regime. On one hand,
prior beliefs are determined by the entire history of monetary policy objectives and shocks and
therefore reﬂect agents’ clarity or confusion about the monetary policy regime. On the other
hand, the role of learning increases when agents are confused. With learning being a major
source of persistence in the model, inﬂation persistence is thereby directly linked to regime
uncertainty and hence to the lack of transparency and stability of the monetary policy.
To measure the impact of regime-uncertainty on inﬂation persistence in our model, we com-
puted the half-life of a shock conditional on agents’ prior beliefs. Figure 9 displays the average
half-life of inﬂation’s impulse response to 1 = −σL in st = L as a function of ˆ υ1,0, agents’
prior inference about being in the high-target regime in the period of the shock.45 Since agents
are in the low-target regime, a high probability given to the other regime reﬂects their confu-
sion about the regime. The results conﬁrm that inﬂation persistence increases with increasing
regime-uncertainty. The average half-life of the shock is of 2.25 quarters when agents are not
confused at all (ˆ υ1,0 = 0). When agents initial belief is ˆ υ1,0 = 0.5, the number of periods
necessary for the initial impact to halve increases by 50% to 3.37 quarters.
45We thank an anonymous referee for the idea of this indicator. The half-life was computed based on the
benchmark parameters with λ = 0.5, for each initial belief ˆ υ1,0 = 0,0.1,...,1, for 1000 draws of stochastic shocks
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persistence with empirically observed degrees of persistence. To this aim, we estimate the sum
of autocorrelation coeﬃcients ρ for the simulated theoretical inﬂation series using the same
methodology as for the observed inﬂation series (see Section 2). Table 3 displays the estimated
median unbiased ρ averaged over 1000 simulations for stable high-target (H) and low-target
(L) periods as well as for a transition period from high to low target (T).46 We also display
the root mean squared inﬂation forecast error standardized by the shocks’ state-conditional
volatility. This indicator allows us to capture the impact of regime-uncertainty on inﬂation
uncertainty while it abstracts from the eﬀect of varying volatility across diﬀerent periods. In
addition, to compare our model with the one relying on structural persistence, we display the
sum of autocorrelation coeﬃcients implied by the Hybrid Phillips Curve model in Table 4.
The following results are worth noting.
First, our model with Bayesian learning can generate realistic degrees of inﬂation persis-
tence as captured by the sum of autocorrelation coeﬃcients ρ. In particular, the persistence
generated for stable periods matches well the values found for the U.S. for the second half of
the 80s. Since the learning mechanism is typically very little triggered in stable periods, the
degrees of persistence implied by the FI and the BL setups are very close in these periods.
For the same reason, there is also little diﬀerence between the degrees of persistence implied
for the stable high-target and the stable low-target regimes.
Second, the results conﬁrm the link between regime-uncertainty and inﬂation persistence in
the learning model. Note, that regime uncertainty also increases the uncertainty about future
inﬂation as captured by the standardized root mean squared inﬂation forecast errors. Hence,
our model correctly implies higher degrees of persistence for periods of greater uncertainty
about future inﬂation. Again, the ρ generated by our BL model for the transition period
is reasonably close to the degree of persistence observed in the U.S. in the 70s and in the
461000 draws of 80 periods each were simulated. Each simulation starts from the steady state in period
1. The regime switches to the high target in period 2 and to the low target in period 41. The stable high
regime is deﬁned between the periods 21 to 40 which allows agents 20 periods to learn previously. Transition
periods are t = 41 to 60. This is longer than the eﬀective learning period which introduces some downward
bias into our persistence estimates. The period was chosen such as not to have too short a subsample. The
stable L regime is t = 61 to 80. For each draw, we estimated the sum of autocorrelation coeﬃcients for the
given periods and then computed the average of the median unbiased estimator. Since the sample periods
are rather short, the maximum laglength was set to 2 and the grid was created on the interval given by the
sample persistence estimate plus and minus 3 OLS standard errors. The simulated series are generated with
the benchmark parameters. λ = 0.5.
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October 2006beginning of the 80s. Note, that uncertainty about the future inﬂation would also increase in
the FI model after the regime shift.47 However, the link between persistence and uncertainty
is only established in the BL model, where uncertainty combined with unobservability of the
current regime triggers the learning mechanism and thereby increases inﬂation persistence in
unstable periods.
Finally, when comparing our model with the Hybrid Phillips Curve model, we ﬁnd that
the structural inﬂation persistence model can, by itself, generate relatively high degrees of
persistence (see FI results). However, it needs the assumption of regime shift and learning
to reproduce diﬀerences in persistence between stable and transition periods.48 Also, the
variation in the persistence implied by the learning mechanism with the HPC remains slightly
below the change predicted using the modiﬁed NKPC. Overall, it should be stressed, that
the assumption of structural inﬂation persistence is not necessary to generate realistic degrees
of inﬂation persistence, and that it is not suﬃcient to track observed changes in inﬂation
persistence. Both can in turn be reasonably well reproduced by regime shifts, imperfect
information and Bayesian learning.
7 Conclusion
This paper presented an extended New Keynesian model in which the monetary policy regime
is subject to shifts. The public cannot directly observe the type of the monetary regime. They
instead perceive regime shifts as a stochastic process and use a Bayesian learning rule to make
inference about the type of the regime. Firms’ price setting is adapted to a world in which
the inﬂation target of the central bank is not constant and not perfectly observable. The
Phillips curve we suggest links the current inﬂation rate to agents’ lagged expectations of the
monetary policy’s target in addition to expected future inﬂation rate.
Admittedly, our model is very simple. Future extensions might consider state-dependent
price setting schemes and / or state-dependent monetary policy-rule coeﬃcients both of which
are arguably plausible in regime-switching environments.49 It might also be interesting to
deﬁne other objects of learning, such as potential output for instance.
47This is due to the uncertainty about the future regimes and the unexpected nature of the regime shift.
48The ρ implied by the HPC even seems to be too high, but it could be decreased by lower values of the
Calvo parameter for instance. Note that partial indexation would also decrease inﬂation persistence. However,
as already noted in section 3.8, partial indexation would imply counterfactual predictions for output in the
regime-shift setup.
49For a model allowing for state-dependent policy-rule coeﬃcients see Davig, Leeper & Chung (2004).
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October 2006Nevertheless, even at this stage, our model is able to reproduce realistic inﬂation and
output dynamics both in transition periods and in stable regimes without relying on the
assumption of intrinsic inﬂation persistence. In addition, the model presents a way in which
monetary policy can shape inﬂation dynamics.
The mechanism by which the monetary policy’s predictability inﬂuences inﬂation dynamics
is driven by the varying incidence of learning in the model. Learning about the unobservable
monetary policy is a major source of persistence in our model. The role of learning increases in
periods of high uncertainty about the monetary policy regime thereby creating a link between
inﬂation persistence and the stability and the transparency of monetary policy.
This endogenous mechanism is an alternative to the assumption of structural persistence in
generating real costs of disinﬂations and inﬂation persistence. However, contrary to structural
inﬂation persistence, our assumptions can in addition account for historically observed changes
in the degree of inﬂation persistence.
The distinction between structural and non-structural inﬂation persistence is not only
interesting for the comparison of inﬂation dynamics between diﬀerent periods and / or diﬀerent
countries; it is also crucial for the optimal conduct of monetary policy. In this sense, our




Working Paper Series No 684
October 20068 Appendix A: Model Solution
The solution method used follows Sims (2002) and Schorfheide (2005).
The linear rational expectations model can be written in the following form:
Γ0˜ xt = C + Γ1˜ xt−1 + ΨC,t + Πηt,
where ˜ xt denotes the vector of the endogenous variables: ˜ xt = (˜ yt, ˜ πt,˜ ıt,Et˜ yt+1,Et˜ πt+1); ηt
stands for expectational errors ηt = (˜ yt − Et−1˜ yt, ˜ πt − Et−1˜ πt). The only exogenous variable
is the composite monetary policy shock C,t.
As shown in Sims(2002) the solution of such a system can be expressed as:






The solution for the matrices Θ1,Θc,Θ0,Θy,Θf and Θz can be found by Sims’ gensys code.50
The model solution under full information (FI) and under Bayesian Learning (BL) diﬀers
only in the way expectations are formed. In the FI model agents can observe the monetary pol-
icy regime. FI expectations are deﬁned by relation (7). Deﬁning the vector ˜ π∗0 ≡

˜ π∗H, ˜ π∗L
,
the expected future composite shock in this setting is then:
EtC,t+j = (1 − λ)(1 − γ) ˜ π∗0Φjυt.
In this case the model solution is a linear.
In contrast, in the BL scenario, where agents cannot directly observe the type of the central
bank, the expectations are deﬁned by (8) along with agents’ optimal inference as expressed in
(3.7). Therefore the expected future composite shock is:
EtC,t+j = (1 − λ)(1 − γ) ˜ π∗0Φjˆ υt (Ωt).
By the optimal inference ˆ υt (Ωt), the BL model’s solution becomes a function of the entire
history of shocks and states as well as of agents’ learning process and it can be highly nonlinear.
The non-linear part is exogenous. The solution can be found recursively.
9 Appendix B: Computation of Impulse Responses
Due to non-linearities implied by the learning mechanism, impulse responses in the BL model
are computed in the following way.51 For both regimes st = H,L, at t = 0, the economy starts
50Available at Chris Sims’ website: http://sims.princeton.edu/yftp/gensys
51For a similar simulation method see Schorfheide (2005).
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October 2006oﬀ in steady-state and switches to the given regime st in period 1 where it remains ﬁxed for
the entire simulation. The period of the shock will be denoted t0 + 1. For both states, two


















is deﬁned as follows: 2
C,t = 1
C,t for t 6= t0 + 1 and 2
C,t = 1
C,t + zσs for t = t0 + 1





, i = 1,2, the trajectories of the inﬂation rate, the output gap, the nominal interest












,i = 1,2. The impulse response of a variable to a






t=t0 over 1000 random draws.






is deﬁned as follows: 2
C,t = 1
C,t
for t 6= t0 + 1 and 2
C,t = (1 − λ)(1 − γ) ˜ π∗s, s = H or L. Everything else is unchanged. The
impulse responses are then sorted across i = 1,...,1000 and the percentiles are then easily
found in the sorted series.
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Table 1: U.S. Inﬂation rate - descriptive statistics
1970Q1 − 1983Q4 1984Q1 − 1991Q3 1991Q4 − 2005Q1 1970Q1 − 2005Q1
CPI mean 7.48 3.97 2.55 4.79
σ 3.79 1.78 1.23 3.43
PGDP mean 6.77 3.29 2.01 4.16
σ 2.40 0.99 0.77 2.70
Forecast RMSE 1.95 1.13 0.88 1.45
Mean and standard error of inﬂation of the CPI and of the GDP deﬂator. Forecast: median one-quarter-
ahead prediction for the growth of GDP deﬂator. Source: Survey of Professional Forecasters, Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. RMSE: root mean squared forecast error; forecast error is the diﬀerence
between the forecast and the realized PGDP annualized qoq growth rate.
Table 2: U.S. Inﬂation persistence

















Hansen (1999) ’grid-bootstrap’ median-unbiased estimates of %, the sum of auto-regressive coeﬃcients
of CPI and GDP deﬂator inﬂation; 90% conﬁdence intervals in parentheses.
Lag-selection based on AIC. For technical details see Section 2.
Table 3: Inﬂation persistence in the model: modiﬁed NKPC




















σs 0.73 1.01 0.75 0.89
Hansen (1999) ’grid-bootstrap’ median-unbiased estimates of %, the sum of auto-regressive coeﬃcients
of simulated inﬂation under FI and BL; 90% conﬁdence intervals in parentheses. Benchmark parameters,
λ = 0.5. Lag-selection based on AIC. For technical details see Section 6.
RMSE: root mean squared forecast error of inﬂation.
Table 4: Inﬂation persistence in the model: HPC

















Hansen (1999) ’grid-bootstrap’ median-unbiased estimates of %, the sum of auto-regressive coeﬃcients
of simulated inﬂation under FI and BL; 90% conﬁdence intervals in parentheses. Benchmark parameters,
λ = 0.5. Lag-selection based on AIC. For technical details see Section 6.41
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Inflation: qoq annualized percentage rates. Upper panel: CPI, Bottom panel GDP deflator. Source IMF IFS; Output gap source OECD;
Inflation forecast: Survey of Professional Forecasters one quarter ahead median annualized growth rate of GDP price index
(before 1996 GDP implicit deflator, before 1992 GNP deflator) 
Figure 1: U.S. data 1970q1-2005q1
Inflation & output gap






Realized vs. forecast inflation
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Regime shift in t=1; lamda=0; periods in quarters. Bayesian learning trajectories are 
averaged over 1000 random draws. Simulations start at t=-40 with prior beliefs are
set to ergodic probabilities. Fourty periods of st=H are simulated before regime shift.
Disinflation trajectories under BL for different speeds of convergence (lamda). Disinflation
simulations are averaged over 1000 random draws. Simulations start at t=-40 with prior beliefs
set to ergodic probabilities. 
Figure 2a: Disinflation Experiment - Modified NKPC
Figure 2b: Disinflation - Speed of convergence
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Sacrifice ratio under FI and BL as a function of the convergence parameter lambda.
Figure 3: Sacrifice Ratio











Disinflation trajectories under BL assuming different pricing schemes. Disinflation
simulations are averaged over 1000 random draws. Prior beliefs are set to ergodic probabilities. 
40 periods of st=H are simulated before regime shift. Lambda=0.
Figure 4: Disinflation - modified NKPC vs. HPC
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Impulse response of inflation, output, nominal interest rate and change in beliefs to ε 1 = -σst (left-hand side)
and to  ε1 = -2σst (right-hand side). st=L, lambda=0.
Simulations averaged over 1000 random draws. Agents are allowed to learn about the regime for 40 periods.
Impulse responses of inflation and output to a 1 standard deviation expansionary shock with 
 modified NKPC and HPC.
Simulations averaged over 1000 random draws. Agents are allowed to learn about the regime for 40 periods.
 st=L, lambda=0.
Figure 5a: Impulse responses to ε1 = -σst and  ε1 = -2σst
Figure 5b: Impulse responses - cross-model comparison
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Change in the probability of state H as function of shock's size zσst. Values of z on horizontal axis.
Figure 6: The role of expectations-formation
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68% probability intervals of forecast errors for inflation, output, nominal interest rate and change in beliefs.
State=H (left-hand side); state=L (right-hand side); lambda=0. Intervals computed over 1000 random draws.
90% probability intervals of forecast errors for inflation, output, nominal interest rate and change in beliefs.
State=H (left-hand side); state=L (right-hand side); lambda=0. Intervals computed over 1000 random draws. 
Figure 7a: Role of expectations-formation - 68% Forecast error intervals
Figure 7b: Role of expectations-formation - 90% Forecast error intervals
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Impulse response to ε1 = -σL. State st=L. λ=0.5.
Stable L = after 40 periods in st=L;
Transition to L = 2 periods after regime switch from st=H to st=L.
Figure 8: Impulse response - Stable regime vs. Transition
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Half-life of initial impact of ε1 = -σst shock on inflation as function of initial beliefs about high-target regime.
st=L, lambda=0.5. Indicator averaged over 1000 random draws.
Figure 9: Average half-life of πt response








Working Paper Series No 684
October 2006
European Central Bank Working Paper Series
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the ECB, please visit the ECB’s website
(http://www.ecb.int)
651 “On the determinants of external imbalances and net international portfolio flows: a global
perspective” by R. A. De Santis and M. Lührmann, July 2006.
652 “Consumer price adjustment under the microscope: Germany in a period of low inflation” by
J. Hoffmann and J.-R. Kurz-Kim, July 2006.
653 “Acquisition versus greenfield: the impact of the mode of foreign bank entry on information and
bank lending rates” by S. Claeys and C. Hainz, July 2006.
654 “The German block of the ESCB multi-country model” by I. Vetlov and T. Warmedinger,
July 2006.
655 “Fiscal and monetary policy in the enlarged European Union” by S. Pogorelec, July 2006.
656 “Public debt and long-term interest rates: the case of Germany, Italy and the USA” by P. Paesani,
R. Strauch and M. Kremer, July 2006.
657 “The impact of ECB monetary policy decisions and communication on the yield curve” by
C. Brand, D. Buncic and J. Turunen, July 2006.
658 “The response of firms‘ investment and financing to adverse cash flow shocks: the role of bank
relationships” by C. Fuss and P. Vermeulen, July 2006.
659 “Monetary policy rules in the pre-EMU era: Is there a common rule?” by M. Eleftheriou,
D. Gerdesmeier and B. Roffia, July 2006.
660 “The Italian block of the ESCB multi-country model” by E. Angelini, A. D’Agostino and
P. McAdam, July 2006.
661 “Fiscal policy in a monetary economy with capital and finite lifetime” by B. Annicchiarico,
N. Giammarioli and A. Piergallini, July 2006.
662 “Cross-border bank contagion in Europe” by R. Gropp, M. Lo Duca and J. Vesala, July 2006.
663
664 “Fiscal convergence before entering the EMU” by L. Onorante, July 2006.
665 “The euro as invoicing currency in international trade” by A. Kamps, August 2006.
666 “Quantifying the impact of structural reforms” by E. Ernst, G. Gong, W. Semmler and
L. Bukeviciute, August 2006.
667 “The behaviour of the real exchange rate: evidence from regression quantiles” by K. Nikolaou,
August 2006.
“Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy” by K. Adam and R. M. Billi, July 2006.ECB
Working Paper Series No 684
October 2006 49
668 “Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations” by
C. Ewerhart, N. Cassola and N. Valla, August 2006.
669 “Regular adjustment: theory and evidence” by J. D. Konieczny and F. Rumler, August 2006.
670 “The importance of being mature: the effect of demographic maturation on global per-capita
GDP” by R. Gómez and P. Hernández de Cos, August 2006.
671 “Business cycle synchronisation in East Asia” by F. Moneta and R. Rüffer, August 2006.
672 “Understanding inflation persistence: a comparison of different models” by H. Dixon and E. Kara,
September 2006.
673 “Optimal monetary policy in the generalized Taylor economy” by E. Kara, September 2006.
674 “A quasi maximum likelihood approach for large approximate dynamic factor models” by C. Doz,
D. Giannone and L. Reichlin, September 2006.
675 “Expansionary fiscal consolidations in Europe: new evidence” by A. Afonso, September 2006.
676 “The distribution of contract durations across firms: a unified framework for understanding and
comparing dynamic wage and price setting models” by H. Dixon, September 2006.
677 “What drives EU banks’ stock returns? Bank-level evidence using the dynamic dividend-discount
model” by O. Castrén, T. Fitzpatrick and M. Sydow, September 2006.
678 “The geography of international portfolio flows, international CAPM and the role of monetary
policy frameworks” by R. A. De Santis, September 2006.
679 “Monetary policy in the media” by H. Berger, M. Ehrmann and M. Fratzscher, September 2006.
680 “Comparing alternative predictors based on large-panel factor models” by A. D’Agostino and
D. Giannone, October 2006.
681 “Regional inflation dynamics within and across euro area countries and a comparison with the US”
by G. W. Beck, K. Hubrich and M. Marcellino, October 2006.
682  “Is reversion to PPP in euro exchange rates non-linear?” by B. Schnatz, October 2006.
683 “Financial integration of new EU Member States” by L. Cappiello, B. Gérard, A. Kadareja and
S. Manganelli, October 2006.
684 “Inflation dynamics and regime shifts” by J. Lendvai, October 2006.ISSN 1561081-0
9 771561 081005